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ABSTRACT. There is consensus that payments for biodiversity services are a promising conservation tool,
yet the implementation of applied schemes has been lagging behind. This paper explores some reasons
why potential biodiversity buyers may hesitate. It describes the case of an unsuccessful attempt to establish
a community conservation concession in the village of Setulang (East Kalimantan, Indonesia) to safeguard
a biologically valuable area from predatory logging. Potential biodiversity donors did not engage in this
payments-for-environmental-services scheme mainly because of their limited time horizon and uneasiness
about the conditionality principle. Other complicating factors included overlapping land claims, and the
diagnosis of the externality at hand. We conclude that new investment modalities and attitudes are needed
if potential biodiversity buyers are to exploit the advantages of this innovative tool. We also provide some
tangible recommendations on factors to consider when designing a compensation scheme for conservation
at the community level.
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INTRODUCTION
Concern is growing over the maintenance of
environmental services, particularly those dependent
on biodiversity and that were previously obtained
for free. Changes in land use and land cover
increasingly threaten the integrity of landscapes and
reduce biodiversity (Hassan et al. 2005). Attempts
to create synergy between conservation and
development by, for example, implementing
integrated conservation and development programs
(ICDPs) have so far had limited success (Kramer et
al. 1997, Brandon et al. 1998). A recent novel
concept, direct payment for environmental services
(PES), is attracting considerable interest as a
potentially more efficient conservation tool (Ferraro
and Kiss 2002) that also bridges trade-offs vis-à-vis
poverty alleviation (Grieg-Gran et al. 2005). A PES
can be defined as a voluntary, contingent transaction
between at least one buyer and at least one provider
of a well-defined environmental services—or a land
use likely to produce that service (Wunder 2007).
Strong theoretical arguments have been made that
PES should be more cost efficient than both ICDPs
and “green premium” approaches (e.g., ecotourism),
mainly because direct contractual conservation does
not require costly investments in alternative
production lines (Simpson and Sedjo 1996, Ferraro
2001, Kiss 2004, Ferraro and Simpson 2002, 2005).
Where have actual PES and PES-like schemes been
applied? Table 1 provides some examples, drawn
from long-standing initiatives, some of which
extend back to 1985. Most have been implemented
in Latin America and in developed countries. The
latter are mainly agri-environmental payment
schemes in which the State is the buyer, often of
multiple services. Some of these schemes are large,
up to 14.5 million ha for the US Conservation
Reserve Program, for example. Conversely, in
developing countries, many schemes are small and
self-organized, e.g., operating at the level of a single
micro watershed (around 500 ha in Pimampiro,
Ecuador). Payment is seldom made directly for
service delivery, but rather for changed land-use
practices that are presumed to provide the targeted
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service(s). As shown in Table 1, many stakeholders
can be involved in PES deals, for instance, with a
public agency or non-governmental organization
(NGO) acting as the honest broker to mediate
between service sellers and buyers.
Biodiversity conservation concessions are one of
the tools within the PES approach. Because habitat
loss is the main factor driving the extinction of
tropical biodiversity, area-based incentive schemes
such as conservation concessions or easements
seem particularly well suited for conserving
biodiversity (Hardner and Rice 2002, Niesten and
Rice 2004), although some have criticized their
possible negative social impacts (Karsenty 2004,
Romero and Andrade 2004). With the incentive of
being seen to lead the way, some agencies have
recently funded PES scoping studies and other
initiatives that could guide future developments, e.
g., the Global Scoping Study on Compensation for
Ecosystem Services, funded by Canada’s
International Development Research Centre (http://
www.worldagroforestrycentre.org/cres/) and Deve-
loping Markets for Watershed Protection Services
and Improved Livelihoods, funded by the UK
Department for International Development(http://w
ww.iied.org/NR/forestry/projects/water.html).
In many cases, it is unclear just who will pay for
biodiversity and the services it provides (see Hassan
et al. (2005) for a description of such services, and
Hooper et al. (2005) for a consensus on the links
between biodiversity and ecosystem functioning).
Most of these conservation services are desired for
the long term, so PES has to be continuous, at least
while the threats remain. Private donations
channeled through conservation organizations
currently seem the best bet. Conservation
International (CI) and the Global Conservation
Fund (GCF) have experimented with conservation
concessions and conservation-incentive agreements
for some years (Niesten and Rice 2004). The Nature
Conservancy (TNC) and the World-Wide Fund for
Nature (WWF) have explored this concept more
recently. The Global Environmental Facility (GEF)
has experimented with direct biodiversity payments
in Costa Rica, Nicaragua, and Colombia (Pagiola et
al. 2004). Both GEF and bilateral conservation
donors often make enabling investments, but expect
others eventually to sustain the payments. Deals
with private companies that use biodiversity as a
production input, for example, the bio-prospecting
contracts between the Costa Rican National
Biodiversity Institute, INBio, and various
pharmaceutical companies, have so far produced
negligible conservation rents. Development donors
and NGOs are interested in the poverty alleviation
potential of PES, but hesitate to go beyond pilot
schemes. If so many in conservation and
development think PES is a good idea, why not test
this tool further by funding such schemes?
This paper describes an unsuccessful attempt to
design a PES scheme and get it funded. It focuses
on lessons learned about the difficulties of securing
direct, area-based, contingent payments to conserve
biodiversity, and our understanding of the reasons
for this failure despite the good intentions on all
sides. The idea involved paying the community of
Setulang, situated in Malinau district in East
Kalimantan (Indonesian Borneo), to keep their
5300-ha forest intact rather than sell the logging
rights to a timber company. The area, close to Kayan
Mentarang National Park, is one of a few remaining
patches of pristine forest in the lowland–mountain
transition zone. Between 2000 and 2003, the area
was threatened by a wave of logging sweeping
through the district, as well as by increasing
pressures to convert forest to other land uses, both
of which threatened the biodiversity values of the
region. One of us (Sayer) first discussed the idea
with the villagers of Setulang in 2000. It was
received positively. For the Center for International
Forestry Research (CIFOR), this initiative provided
a chance to “learn by doing,” a process that might
help to produce a replicable model of conservation
with local rewards. Therefore, we negotiated for
more than 18 months with three donors: one
international conservation organization and two
corporate enterprise funds. Despite prolonged
negotiations, we were unable to convince any of the
three to support the idea. The obstacles we
encountered are probably more general than this
particular case.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section
describes Setulang village, its history, land use,
biodiversity context, and community conservation
actions, and the influence of the logging industry.
Following that, we describe in more detail the
interactions between Setulang and various logging
companies. We then explain the idea of the
community conservation concession and how it was
received by both the local community and the
prospective donors. Finally, we discuss the
outcomes and their consequences before concluding
with some lessons learned.
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Table 1. Examples of PES-type experiences worldwide (RISEMP = Regional Integrated Silvopastoral
Ecosystem Management Project; NGO = non-governmental organization; IO = international organization;
n.a. = not available).
Scheme Location(s) Service(s) Land uses
paid for
Seller age-
ncy
Scale of
transaction
Spatial extent
(ha)
Start
year
Source(s)
RISEMP Colombia
Costa Rica
Nicaragua
Biodiversity,
carbon
Restoration
(silvopasture)
NGOs, IO,
states
International 3500 2002 Pagiola et al. (2004,
2007)
Pimampiro Ecuador Watershed Conservation/
minor restor-
ation
Municipal
government
Local 496 2000 Echavarría et al.
(2004), Wunder and
Albán (2008)
Working for
Water Prog-
ramme
South Africa Watersheds,
biodiversity
Restoration Central St-
ate
National n.a. 1995 Turpie et al. (2008)
Conservation
Reserve Pr-
ogram
USA Watersheds,
biodiversity,
soil protection
Restoration
(agricultural
practices; land
retirement)
Central St-
ate
National 14 500 000 1985 Claassen et al.
(2008)
PROFAFOR Ecuador Carbon Restoration
(plantation)
Private co-
mpany
Regional --
mostly Andes
22 300 1993 Albán and Argüello
(2004), Wunder and
Albán (2008)
PSA Costa Rica Carbon, wa-
tersheds, bi-
odiversity,
landscapes
Conservation/
minor restor-
ation
Public sec-
tor+
National 270 000 1996 Pagiola (2008)
Vittel France Watershed Conservation/
restoration
(agricultural
practices)
Private co-
mpany
Local 5100 1993 Perrot-Maître (2006)
CONTEXT
History and Land Use
Setulang Village (3º 27’ 12”N, 116º 29’ 56”E) is
located in the Malinau River watershed at the
junction of the Setulang and Malinau rivers, 29 km
upstream from Malinau, the district capital. This
watershed is the most densely populated and
developed rural area in the district, supporting about
6673 people distributed among 21 settlements
(Voting Census data April 2003), although overall
rural population density is low (average 1.3 person/
km2, Wollenberg et al. (2007)). In 2005, 945 people
(226 households) lived in the village in five
community clusters (Gunarso et al. 2006).
The village lands cover 11 800 ha, more or less
equally partitioned between an alluvial plain
flanking the Malinau River, and containing the
settlement and agricultural lands, and a forested
upland area, at 150–500 m elevation, steeply
dissected by numerous small streams that flow into
the Setulang River (Fig. 1). The economy is based
on a combination of subsistence agriculture, the sale
of surplus crops, particularly rice, in Malinau town,
and the extraction of forest products such as game,
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fibers, and poles. Off-farm income comes mainly
from younger people working for timber companies
in Malaysia and overseas, money that is used for
buying large capital items such as electricity
generators or outboard motors, or for building
houses. By local standards, Setulang is not a poor
village, because of—among other things—its
considerable agricultural production (Iwan 2003).
The people in Setulang belong to the Kenyah Oma’
Long (Dayak) ethnic group, in contrast to
surrounding communities, which comprise a more
heterogeneous mix of Punan, Putuk, Abai, and
Kenyah Uma’ Lasan ethnic groups. The villagers of
Setulang are relatively recent immigrants to the
area, having moved in 1968 from their previous
settlement at Long Sa’an, a remote village 125 km
away on the upper reaches of the Pujungan River,
to gain better access to markets and social services.
The move was authorized by the Malinau River
Customary Chief and the Subdistrict Administrator
in Malinau. It was confirmed by the Bulungan
Regent in 1974, in a written decree that broadly
described Setulang’s upstream and downstream
limits with the villages of Setarap and Sentaban
respectively, but not precisely the interior
boundaries (Iwan 2003). Whereas those in Setulang
claim that they moved into an empty area, more
likely it was being used extensively by neighboring
villages (de Beer 2003).
Land Use and Land Cover
The villagers of Setulang practice a mix of shifting
cultivation, agroforestry, and semi-permanent
gardening, supplemented by fishing, hunting, and
gathering. About 42% of the village lands are
cultivated or lying fallow (mainly under bush and
scrub), 44% is primary forest, 13% degraded forest,
and 1% rivers and fringing vegetation (derived from
a digital land-cover map prepared by CIFOR’s
Geographic Information Systems Unit using
Landsat 7 data). Most of the lowland has been
modified through transformation to agricultural
land and timber extraction for local building
materials, but the upland, which forms the
catchment of the Setulang River, remains relatively
intact. In mid 2000, the community set aside about
5300 ha of this area as a “Tane' Olen” (protected
forest) to be used for subsistence hunting and to
secure clean water (Iwan 2003). It is managed by
the Tane' Olen Management Committee. Shifting
cultivation in this area is prohibited, and effective
internal rules only allow benign extractive uses.
Active protection measures are taken against
intruders. Except for a couple of episodes (described
below), the forest has never been logged, and so
appears largely undisturbed (de Beer 2003, Iwan
2003, Sidiyasa et al. 2006). In addition to the Tane'
Olen forest, a smaller area on the other side of the
Malinau River, also claimed by Setulang, contains
important habitat for the Bornean gibbon
(Hylobates mulleri). As this area is steep and rocky,
the villagers had already set it aside for subsistence
hunting and the extraction of non-timber forest
products. The idea of actively conserving this area,
other than for low-intensity use, arose during
discussions with a World Conservation Union
consultant (de Beer 2003) and was subsequently
finalized when the community drew up its land-use
plan with help from CIFOR (Iwan 2006, Limberg
et al. 2007).
Biodiversity and Conservation
The natural vegetation of the area is classified as
lowland mixed dipterocarp forest, dominated by
trees in the families Dipterocarpaceae (21 species
in five genera: Shorea, Dipterocarpus, Dryobalanops,
Parashorea, and Vatica), Myristicaceae (13 species
in four genera, including Knema (5 species),
Myristica (4), and Horsfieldia (3)), Lauraceae (12
species in seven genera, including the important
timber species Eusideroxylon zwageri). A forest
inventory along four 20 m wide parallel transects,
spanning 24.9 km overall within the Tane' Olen, was
carried out in 2004–2005 with the assistance of
knowledgeable villagers. The mean density and
volume of trees >20cm diameter at breast height
(DBH) was 201 individuals/ha and 421 m3/ha,
respectively (Sidiyasa et al. 2006). More detailed
sampling of trees >10cm DBH in 67 0.01-ha
quadrats along the transects produced 157 species
belonging to 90 genera in 46 families, higher
numbers than those recorded during other forest
inventories carried out in Kalimantan, except for
Apo Kayan, East Kalimantan, where 175 species
were recorded in quadrats totaling 0.8 ha. When
adults, saplings, and seedlings are considered
together, a total of 218 tree species belonging to 120
genera in 53 families were recorded in the 0.67 ha
sampled (Sidiyasa et al. 2006).
We currently do not have detailed measures of the
richness of other components of biodiversity in this
particular forest. Some species of global and
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Fig. 1. Location of Setulang Village in Malinau District, East Kalimantan, Indonesia, showing
generalized vegetation cover and land use, as well as the two protected community forest areas (one
proposed) referred to in the text.
national conservation concern have been noted,
including Malayan sun bear (Ursus malayanus), the
tree ferns Cyathea borneensis and C. glabra, and
the palm Caryota no (de Beer 2003, Sidiyasa et al.
2006). More broadly, the forest is situated on the
fringe of the proposed Heart of Borneo
transboundary conservation area, a 220 000 km2 
region of rainforest spanning the highlands of
Brunei, Indonesia, and Malaysia. After the Amazon
and Congo Basin forests, this is the world’s third
largest remaining tropical forest, and a globally
important center of biodiversity, some of it still
undescribed. During detailed biological surveys of
the Malinau Research Forest, just south of Setulang,
more than 2000 plant species were recorded from
among 15 430 plants surveyed. Of these, more than
900 were tree species within 280 genera and 80
families (Sheil 2002). A single 1-ha plot produced
207 tree species with stems >10 cm DBH, one of
the richest plots yet surveyed in Indonesia (D. Sheil,
personal e-communication, 30 January 2008).
These surveys also documented 239 species of birds
(about 86% of those expected for the area), 37
species of mammals (56% of the potential
maximum), 40 species of amphibians (with four
more reliably reported by local people), 55 species
of reptiles, and 42 species of fish (Meijaard et al.
2005). The biodiversity of this region is exceptional.
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Forest Clearance
The lowland dipterocarp forests of Kalimantan are
not only the most diverse of Indonesia’s forests, but
also arguably the most threatened. Lowland forest
cover declined by 58% from an estimated 11.1
million ha in 1985 to 4.7 million ha in 1997, an
annual rate of loss of 7%, well above the 2.1%
annual loss of forest cover generally in Kalimantan
(Holmes 2002). Forest cover has continued to
decline at about 2% per year, although no
breakdown by forest type is available (Fuller et al.
2004). The main causes of forest loss have been
large-scale logging, alone or in conjunction with
land clearance for purposes of establishing
industrial plantations (mainly for timber and palm
oil); small-scale clearance for subsistence
agriculture, small plantations, or the establishment
of new settlements under Indonesia’s former
transmigration scheme. Forest fires, often lit
deliberately when clearing large areas of land for
industrial plantations, compound the problem
(Holmes 2002, Forest Watch Indonesia/Global
Forest Watch 2002).
Logging
Access to, use of, and responsibility for Indonesia’s
considerable forest resources has long been a source
of tension between central government, provincial
and district administrations, and local people. The
balance of power has shifted with changes in
governments and their policies, complicated by
ambiguities in land designation, ownership, and
rights, along with overlapping jurisdictions, self-
serving authority, nepotism, and widespread
unlawful activity at various levels (Brown 1999,
Barr et al. 2001, Casson and Obidzinski 2007). Up
to the late 1960s, local communities, district
authorities, and regional administrations could
undertake small-scale non-mechanized logging or
issue permits for limited logging concessions, a
system designed to secure the political allegiance
and cooperation of local politicians for those in
power (Obidzinski 2005). Most rural communities
benefited only marginally through occasional
employment. Difficulties of access usually limited
the amount of timber extracted.
From 1970 onward, the government centralized
control and allocated concessions, “Hak Pengusahaan
Hutan,” to large conglomerates with close ties to the
family of the then-President, General Suharto, and
to the military. The forests of Setulang fell within
the concession area of PT Inhutani I, one of five
state industrial forestry companies. All logging had
to be mechanized, which excluded small-scale non-
mechanized operators. Permit holders were
required to practice selective logging, rotational
harvesting, and enrichment planting on logged areas
(Barr et al. 2001). Customary rights were eroded.
People living in and around the concession areas
received few benefits other than through occasional
employment. Some allowed cutting to take place on
community forest land, or engaged in illegal felling
and sale of trees to timber companies (Obidzinski
2005). By all accounts, illegal logging was
widespread, with timber processing capacity
exceeding sustainable supply. Shortfalls were
overcome by concessionaires harvesting more than
their allowable annual cut, logging on short-rotation
cycles or outside approved areas, and buying
illegally harvested logs (Barr 2001, Smith et al.
2007).
Following the fall of Suharto in 1998 and the
decentralization of many instruments of government,
district authorities were authorized to issue small-
scale logging permits, “Izin Pemungutan
Pemanfaatan Kayu” (IPPK), for areas designated as
either community or privately owned forest. These
permits could be granted to individual landowners,
cooperatives, farmers’ and community conservation
groups, or companies of various kinds (Barr et al.
2001). They allowed the holder to harvest timber
and convert forest land to agriculture. Although
legally the forests remained state land, revisions to
the forestry law and a decree by the Ministry of
Agriculture formally recognized “adat,” the system
of collective cultural beliefs, rights, and
responsibilities held by different indigenous groups
and administered by self-governing customary
courts, laws, practices, and dispute-resolution
processes (Alcorn 2000, Li 2001). This recognition
enabled communities to lay legal claim to their
forest resources and appropriate more of the timber
rent.
Most IPPK concessions were harvested mechanically.
Local timber brokers negotiated the transfer of
rights to harvest timber from a community to a
logging company or contractor in exchange either
for cash or an in-kind settlement, or both, before
securing the necessary IPPK from local
government. Many logging companies with IPPK
defaulted fully or partially on the promised fees,
leaving communities with degraded forests. Cash
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transfers varied greatly depending on forest size,
timber quality and access, and a community’s
negotiating skills, level of internal organization,
strength of relationship with district government,
and the credibility of threats to blockade logging
operations in the event of non-payment (Engel and
Palmer 2006, Palmer 2007, Wollenberg et al. 2006).
Because the loggers were no longer backed by the
military or by central government, forceful local
communities were able to act against companies
(see below). Increasing problems with IPPK caused
the central government in 2000 to revoke the right
of district authorities to issue IPPK. Following a
further decree in 2002, logging under IPPK stopped
in 2003 (Barr et al. 2006).
INTERACTIONS BETWEEN SETULANG
AND LOGGING COMPANIES
The villagers of Setulang were affected by
developments in the forestry industry in various
ways. In 1974, two logging companies operating
out of the neighboring villages of Sentaban and
Setarap damaged some of the forests claimed by
Setulang, causing the rivers to become turbid and
threatening drinking water supplies. In 1995, a
timber broker approached the community about
logging the upper Setulang watershed, but was
rejected. Between 2000 and 2002, at the peak of
logging under IPPK, the community was
approached by timber brokers on eight occasions to
log the Tane' Olen forest. Despite the increasing
value of these offers, the largest of which was priced
at $300 000, a majority in the community chose to
decline them, although minority voices started to
perceive potential advantages in the offers (Iwan
2003).
In September 2002, villagers hunting in the upper
Setulang watershed found that 33 meranti trees
(Shorea sp.) had been logged and removed. They
approached the camp of the company, CV Gading
Indah, operating out of the neighboring village of
Setarap, and confiscated their heavy machinery,
bringing logging to a standstill. The village
demanded compensation from the company of 5
billion rupiah (US$555 000 at the prevailing
exchange rate). Tough negotiations over the
following month, mediated by the district
government, resulted in the company agreeing to
pay Rp.400 million (over US$44 000) in
compensation. Rp.200 million was paid in October
2002 (Iwan 2003). A further Rp.100 million was
paid in early 2006; the balance is still outstanding.
In December 2002, in a similar episode, PT Lestari
Timur Indonusa started logging the Tane' Olen
forest. Upon discovery, villagers impounded heavy
machinery, removed the keys, and referred the
matter to the sub-district administration (Iwan
2004). Various confrontations followed, but in the
end, no compensation was paid (G. Limberg and R.
Iwan, personal e-communication, 20 September
2007). Finally, the community successfully
confronted the state logging company, PT Inhutani
II, who had ordered villagers off their lands across
the Malinau R on the grounds that these were part
of Tanjung Lapang village, for whom PT Inhutani
II was going to clear the land for agriculture.
By these actions, the community of Setulang
showed its willingness to protect its forest and use
force to halt logging. It also received substantial
monetary compensation for one illegal intrusion.
External pro-conservation interests acknowledged
and supported these efforts. Because its main motive
had been to conserve clean river water, Setulang
was selected as one of three villages to represent
Indonesia at a World Water Day ceremony in Kyoto,
Japan in March 2003. Through CIFOR, Setulang
was also nominated for, and in June 2003 received,
the Kalpataru Award from the Indonesian Ministry
of Environment for an outstanding effort to protect
their local environment (Iwan 2003).
THE COMMUNITY CONSERVATION
CONCESSION IDEA
In choosing to protect its forests and act forcefully
and consistently against illegal loggers, Setulang
acquired a reputation for exercising strong
collective control over its natural resources (see
Iwan 2003, 2006, and Anau et al. 2005 for details).
Why then offer the villagers a community
conservation concession (CCC), under which they
would be paid for conservation, contingent upon
their performance?
There were two main reasons for the idea. First, with
the ever-mounting offers from logging companies,
we perceived the danger that internal collective
conservation preferences could erode; some
community members had already argued that the
offers should perhaps be considered. Second,
pressures from external pro-logging interests were
creating additional direct community protection
costs (e.g., monitoring). In other words, both push
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and pull factors could mean that a tipping point
might be reached in the future where conservation
attitudes could be jeopardized. Payments under a
CCC could counteract this.
Nevertheless, the CCC scheme was challenged by
the partly overlapping land claims of neighboring
communities, and by the economic interests of
influential external pro-logging actors—in particular
local government and logging companies—who
would stand to lose if a CCC was implemented.
Technical considerations include the extent of
additionality, the potential for leakage, the
permanence of the solution, and what constitutes an
appropriate level of compensation (see below).
Local Reactions
We discussed the basic idea of a CCC with villagers
at four meetings, and it was received positively.
They suggested using the prospective payments for
such things as financing the costs of forest
protection, strengthening land tenure through land
demarcation, and improving village infrastructure.
Views differed on whether money should be
disbursed directly to households. Most villagers saw
an advantage in annual installments, rather than the
one-off payments being offered by logging
companies. They reasoned that, in other villages,
the sudden appearance of relatively large amounts
of cash had generated spending sprees with little
long-term improvement in the quality of life. They
thought it better to absorb smaller amounts of money
received on a regular, predictable basis. This
preference for smaller periodic disbursements over
a larger early one-off payment suggests that people
in Setulang have long planning horizons and are
implicitly and unusually adopting a “negative
discount rate”: a sum of money paid upfront is
valued less than the same quantity distributed
periodically in smaller amounts in the future.
The community disliked the term “concession” in
the CCC concept, associating it with external
control (e.g., by logging companies). It clearly
wished to retain control over land use. Moreover,
the district government had said that, because
logging concessions pay taxes, conservation
concessions should do the same. The term
“sponsorship” was thus preferred, the argument
being that just as a football team could play with or
without sponsorship, but would do better if
sponsored, so too the community, in conserving its
forest, would be more successful if supported
externally (de Beer 2003). This retained the element
of contingency, as the sponsor could withdraw if the
contract was violated or the desired outcome was
not achieved.
Conservation Opportunity Costs and
Concession Payments
How much should those interested in conservation
be prepared to pay to reward Setulang for
conserving the forest? The timber stocks and
biodiversity values of the Setulang forest had not
yet been surveyed. The one-off payments offered
by timber brokers to Setulang provide one measure
of the opportunity costs of conservation, the benefit
that the community would forego by deciding to
conserve the forest. The highest offer was about
US$300 000 (Iwan 2003), corresponding to
US$56.60/ha or US$1442 per household. It is
possible that this amount was deliberately
overstated to secure the permit, but with no intention
of paying the full amount. Nevertheless, in the first
CCC proposal prepared, based on preliminary
consultations with Setulang, we sought an annual
payment of US$30 000/year, at least for an initial
period of 5 years, which might be competitive with
the timber broker’s high one-off offer.
Later negotiations revealed that people would
accept lower amounts, down to as little as US$2000
per year (Setulang village meeting, April 2003). The
motives for this seemed obvious: the community
would stand to lose significant domestic benefits—
clean water, game, building material, etc.—if the
forest was logged. The value of these benefits needs
to be subtracted before arriving at the net
opportunity cost of conservation. Whereas some of
these benefits (e.g., wood extraction) can be valued
in economic terms, others such as clean water are
more difficult. Some, e.g., cultural values, are
basically impossible to express in monetary terms.
It is questionable whether an explicit economic
valuation exercise would add much insight in this
case.
Three Community Conservation Concession
Proposals
Between July 2002 and December 2003, the Center
for International Forestry Research (CIFOR)
prepared three proposals: two for corporate donors
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and one for an international conservation
organization. Informal contacts with a foreign oil
company operating in Indonesia suggested possible
interest in funding conservation and community-
development activities. The company’s independently
operated development fund had already financed
conservation activities elsewhere, including the
nearby Kayan Mentarang National Park. The
proposal, for US$205 000 over 5 years, was the
largest of the three we prepared. Three-quarters of
this—US$30 000 committed annually for 5 years—
was budgeted for community payments proper,
based on assumed local opportunity costs. US$45
000 was set aside to facilitate cross-site visits by
other communities and the production of a video,
aimed at scaling-up the initiative if successful. The
remaining US$10 000 was to fund an Indonesian
student. CIFOR offered considerable counterpart
resources, for example by helping to negotiate the
agreement, monitor compliance, and document and
analyze the process. The initiative eventually stalled
for reasons similar to those encountered in
negotiating the next proposal.
A large international bank’s corporate fund for
financing community-based conservation was
contacted in early 2003. The fund’s mandate was
“to finance projects that help local communities
become self-sufficient in terms of conservation-
based economic development” (I. Fiszel-Bieler,
personal e-communication, 21 July 2003). We
requested US$50 000, a much smaller grant than
from the oil company, because of the donor’s lower
financing ceiling, shorter time horizon (maximum
3 years), and our recognition that Setulang would
accept less for a pilot scheme. CIFOR was to provide
counterpart commitments similar to those in the oil
company proposal. Protracted negotiations took
place in the first half of 2003. From the outset, the
donor was concerned about the sustainability of the
CCC, yet the time horizon was insufficient for a
long-lasting CCC scheme. Our proposal, submitted
in July 2003, focused on creating a US$36 000 trust
fund, with an estimated yearly 5% financial return
(US$1800). We hoped to supplement this with funds
from other donors to produce a more competitive
annual return. In contrast, the donor wanted the fund
to yield a financial return for distribution to the
community and provide rotating loans for
productive activities within it. In a revised plan, we
made the loans contingent on the community not
selling their timber rights. An Indonesian NGO
specialized in revolving funds would oversee
implementation. It soon became clear that the donor
would not support a scheme that placed a cap on
local land use, or that tied support directly to
compliance with this cap, as this appeared to be
buying the land, something for which the fund had
no mandate. Instead, the donor suggested a more
conventional 3-year project, with activities centered
on creating employment and generating additional
income, aimed at distracting attention from the cash-
for-logging option. Adopting this proposal would
mean severing the link between performance and
payment (“contingency”), a key concept of both
PES and the CCC. It left little room for further
negotiations.
An international conservation NGO, active in the
field of conservation but with an increasingly
people-oriented focus, was contacted in late 2002.
It looked the most promising of the three options as
the specific budget line to which we applied was
described as involving long-term acquisition of
land-use and ownership rights through purchase or
lease. Two versions of the same proposal were
submitted in 2003, the first for US$38 000 and a
revised one some months later for US$41 160. In
both cases around 75% of the total budget would be
transferred in cash to an existing village community
development fund, the balance being used for
specific activities and training related to forest
protection. Much time was spent clarifying issues
and discussing critical points. As this was a new
type of initiative, the donor investigated the options
in detail, including hiring a consultant to visit both
CIFOR and Setulang. Following the consultant’s
report (de Beer 2003), the donor decided not to
finance the project under the specified budget line
but encouraged resubmission if the focus shifted to
“inter- and intra[-]village consultation, development
of tourism facilities, establishing a credit union,
improving school curriculum and implementation
of forest (co)management activities” (M.
Hoogeslag, personal e-communication, 15 December
2003). In effect, the donor wanted to pursue a more
traditional Integrated Conservation and Development
Project (ICDP). One reason was the perceived
danger of the CCC intensifying conflict with
neighboring villages over the unclear boundaries.
A second was a dislike of the concept of “quid pro
quo” payments: the consultancy report had
identified “the risk of a too direct link between
conservation and money given” (de Beer 2003).
This sudden turnaround led CIFOR to abandon the
proposal, because the innovative part of the project
would be lost. A much smaller Rp 60 million
(US$6300) grant was eventually disbursed and split
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equally among the villages of Setulang, Sentaban,
and Setarap to facilitate community-based forest
management activities. Setulang used its funds to
survey and demarcate the Tane' Olen forest
(Sidiyasa et al. 2006), undertake training on
ecotourism development and mushroom cultivation,
improve communication with neighboring villages,
and agree on rules and sanctions governing the
protected forest (Gunarso et al. 2006).
Rights, Rules, and Rewards
Land tenure and resource access are critical factors
affecting the feasibility of a CCC. Both depend on
relationships with the State and neighboring
communities. Setulang denies any uncertainty over
its borders (Setulang village meeting, February
2003), but neighbors on three sides challenged the
rights of Setulang, a village of recent immigrants,
to claim all the forest area (de Beer 2003). Village
land rights are well-defined in the core area, but are
ambiguous along the margins, other than with
Setarap, the southern neighbor, with which Setulang
has established friendly relations and a clearly
defined border. During Setulang’s disputes with
loggers, the contractors concerned operated out of
neighboring village territories, claiming they were
blameless because the village borders were unclear.
Whether justified or not, this reflected various
unresolved border conflicts. Fuzzy boundaries are
accepted as long as there is little at stake, but once
the potential high economic value of the resources
therein is recognized and opportunities arise to
harness it, land claims and conflicts intensify, the
ambiguities of traditional rights are exposed, and
there is a drive to establish property rights. To
resolve these conflicts, steps were taken to establish
dialogue among the villages concerned, out of
which came broad agreement on the need to protect
the remaining forest in each village territory.
Nevertheless, agreeing on mutually acceptable
boundaries remained the priority (Gunarso et al.
2006).
The legal status of Setulang’s protected forest is also
ambiguous. The District Forestry and Plantation
Office claims that the contested forest was declared
a protected forest in 1971 under the provincial land-
use plan for East Kalimantan, although the villagers
had no knowledge of this (Iwan 2004). If true, then
Setulang would lose its leverage over the land and
its right to compensation, because the government
would then be in charge of protecting the forest.
Ironically, had this been the case previously, the
area de facto would have been logged, but by
exploiting all the uncertainties and ambiguities,
Setulang effectively marginalized the 1971
declaration.
Setulang had held preliminary discussions with the
Ministry of Forestry about declaring the upper
Setulang catchment a Forest for Special Purposes
(“Kawasan Dengan Tujuan Istimewa,” KDTI), a
process requiring a forest inventory and resolution
of any border conflicts (P. Gunarso, personal e-
communication, 22 July 2003). At present, such a
decree, issued by central government without the
district government’s consent, would be little more
than a paper declaration. It would reduce the
village’s legal ownership and management
flexibility, even more than if it was a protected
forest. This could jeopardize the CCC proposal,
which hinges on the assumption that the village can
make proper, legal, land-use choices. If the forest
was declared a KDTI, it would be meaningless to
pay the community a contingency fee for merely
respecting the law. With these drawbacks, Setulang
has so far not pursued this option further.
In addition to the claims made by neighboring
villages, other parties have interests in the outcome
and could influence whether the Setulang forest
should be logged or conserved. These include the
central government in Jakarta, whose position is
equivocal, recognizing both the long-term benefits
of conservation and the more immediate
contribution of logging to Indonesia’s economy.
Nevertheless, central government probably has
limited influence on local land-use decisions, and
so would not need compensation. In contrast, the
district government is more influential although also
subject to opposing forces. There are considerable
public relations benefits in being seen to support the
CCC, an institutional novelty in Indonesia, thereby
boosting the green image of Malinau District.
Against this, the district government stands to lose
logging revenues. On balance, district officials are
probably largely opposed to the CCC. Without their
approval, the scheme might be unsustainable.
Whether and how the district government should be
rewarded would have to be negotiated. Finally,
logging companies and their intermediaries capture
most of the timber rents and so stand to lose most
from the CCC. They were obviously keen to log the
area, and might lobby strongly against a CCC, but
as they have no legitimate area-specific claims, they
would not have to be compensated.
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Environmental Efficiency
Three main factors need to be considered in making
such interventions environmentally efficient:
additionality, leakage, and permanence (Wunder
2007). If the Setulang community is already
committed to conserving its forest, would a CCC
have any additional effect? Could a CCC have,
perversely, a “subtractional” effect, with external
payments weakening internal motivations to
safeguard the forest (Sengupta et al. 2003)? This is
ultimately an empirical question that cannot be
resolved beforehand. Nevertheless, given some
division of interest within Setulang and incremental
protection and opportunity costs (see above), the
CCC might provide a tangible, positive economic
incentive. Although most people currently do not
favor selling their logging rights, if they were to
change their minds—a danger indicated by the
minority pro-timber voices occasionally heard
within the community—this would probably only
be known externally once it was too late, and the
tipping point had already been passed. This favors
being proactive.
Leakage could happen if logging and associated
pressures on biodiversity are moved elsewhere.
Complete leakage only occurs, however, if logging
is wholly demand driven, which it is not. Even a
small decrease in the area available for logging
reduces its scale. If the Setulang forest has some
special biodiversity values, as we suggest, then even
partial displacement produces a further net positive
outcome. Moreover, if this initiative was successful,
other communities might follow suit. Should a local
market for conservation services emerge, it could
reduce logging more widely.
The permanence of a CCC depends on the duration
of the payments and their continued success in
protecting biodiversity against both internal and
external threats. Obviously, conservation preferences
in the village may change, local institutions could
fail, funding may cease, or external actors (district
government, neighboring villages) might intervene
to impose a different outcome. Within current
constraints, the proposed CCC design, with equal-
sized recurrent payments, and some consultation
and participation of external actors, seems the most
sustainable option.
DISCUSSION
Why did the CCC initiative fail? On the community
side, there was certainly widespread enthusiasm.
But, despite initial interest and prolonged
negotiations, none of the three prospective donors
were convinced enough to support it. Two of the
three were eager to finance other activities in
Setulang in line with a more conventional Integrated
Conservation and Development Project (ICDP).
Two common obstacles shaped the outcome.
First, none of the donors had a time horizon to make
continuous payments over more than 3 years, yet
the funds they offered were insufficient to create a
trust fund that would have allowed payments to be
stretched over a longer period. Simply financing 3-
year pilot payments in the hope it could be extended
later appeared unsustainable to them. They also
implied that paying year after year without changing
the rules or logic of the system was unsatisfactory.
They preferred a solution that would somehow fix
the problem, as they saw it, within their restricted
project timeframe. But payments for environmental
services (PES) make most sense exactly in those
cases where short-term solutions are unlikely to
work and the recognition of lasting trade-offs is
necessary, as in Setulang.
Second, all the potential donors felt uncomfortable
ultimately with the notion of contingent payments.
They reasoned that their image of being benevolent
benefactors would suffer if they withdrew funding
in the case of non-compliance. Moreover, they
feared being accused of seeming to be overbearing
in their dealings with a poor Indonesian village.
Even the international conservation organization,
striving to gain a pro-poor image, was concerned
about the possibility of having to go against local
people’s interests.
The donors also raised two important legitimate
concerns: uncertain land tenure and the nature of
the conservation problem. One donor in particular
was apprehensive about the potential for a CCC to
exacerbate inter-village conflicts over land.
Whereas we agreed that this was an issue, it did not
seem to be an absolute impediment. If it was, then
a CCC or other area-based PES scheme would be
unworkable in any forest-dwelling community in
Indonesia (and beyond), because uncertain land
tenure is the national norm rather than the exception.
Competition and conflict are invariably low
wherever land is used extensively and intermittently
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for extracting low-value resources. Tensions
emerge when more profitable opportunities, such as
timber harvesting or ecotourism—suggested by one
of the donors—arise. The advantage of an area-
based agreement is that the issue of land tenure is
brought into the open, whereas a conventional ICDP
tends to obscure it behind a screen of project
investments and activities. Common solutions
include clarifying the boundaries beforehand,
buying out the weaker claims, or sharing the
benefits. As it is, the boundary disputes between
Setulang and its neighbors have now been resolved,
leaving the Tane' Olen intact, albeit for reasons other
than establishing a CCC (Godwin Limberg and
Ramses Iwan, personal communication, 3
September 2007).
The rationale for any local-level conservation
intervention is that the local landholder’s preferred
land use is sub-optimal for external users of the
service, causing a lasting externality. Direct PES,
including CCC, is most appropriate where such
externalities are likely to persist, making continuous
compensation desirable. In contrast, an ICDP may
be more suitable when discrete interventions exist
that help overcome profitability gaps and eliminate
the externality (Wunder 2005). The threat to
biodiversity posed by logging the forest at Setulang
would seem to be addressed more directly and cost-
effectively through a CCC. The discrete project
interventions suggested to us by the donors—setting
up a revolving credit fund and an ecotourism project
—appear too expensive and likely to fail. Revolving
credit funds in the region have been plagued by high
administrative costs and low repayment rates
(Holloh 2001, Conroy 2003). Moreover, there is no
direct link to conservation. The sustainability of the
suggested ecotourism project is also questionable,
given the remoteness of the area, difficulties in
access, and concerns internationally over security
in Indonesia. Local tourism is an option, but is
hardly likely to produce sufficient revenue to
counterbalance the pressures from logging.
In short, although both approaches face similar
challenges, an ICDP seems more costly to initiate
and implement. Net benefits received by the
community are probably less because of higher
overheads and start-up costs. Whereas the
sustainability of a CCC depends on ongoing
payments, this probably applies to ICDPs as well,
because of the need to subsidize unprofitable
projects or initiate new ones when others fail. An
ICDP probably does not provide the same
opportunity for learning and extension as does
experimenting with the more innovative CCC.
Ultimately, the innovative notion of “buying
biodiversity benefits” was not genuinely reconcilable
with the donors’ agendas—in either temporal or
conditional terms. Their approach reflected a desire
to support simultaneously both socioeconomic
development and biodiversity conservation,
treating them as inextricable. Their agenda is
commendably altruistic; they expect little more than
a positive public image and all-round gratitude. But
this fuzziness of objective could compromise both
outcomes. Had poverty alleviation been the
overriding concern, then Setulang was probably not
the appropriate target; other villages in the region
are much poorer. Had biodiversity conservation
been the priority, then the Setulang CCC ought to
have been supported; a local conservation initiative
would have been rewarded (and, incidentally, local
incomes would have increased). But, by addressing
neither of the objectives directly, little progress was
made in achieving either of them.
CONCLUSIONS
Five main lessons emerge from this study. First, to
meet the challenge of successfully reconciling
conservation and development, we need to test and
refine more innovative approaches. Donors and
other potential biodiversity buyers should be
encouraged to be more adventurous and support
such efforts, despite new modalities and the risks
involved. That will require longer time horizons and
the courage to employ direct, conditional payments.
Given the need for accountability, the conservatism
of donors is understandable, but breakthroughs will
not happen if opportunities to experiment, observe
outcomes, and adapt are missed. Conversely,
sticking exclusively to an integrated conservation-
cum-development agenda is likely to produce
inefficient interventions in many hands-on
situations, where the generalized problem is the
lasting nature of the externality; where forests may
not be worth enough to local stakeholders to
conserve actively without external compensations,
and where there are no quick, discrete fixes.
Second, opportunity costs are the key concept for
determining payment size and willingness to accept
a CCC. In the case of East Kalimantan, these costs
will often be high and front-loaded (due to the
profitability of cashing in logging rents), rising over
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time (due to higher company offers), and borne by
multiple stakeholders along the value-added chain
(see next point). Nevertheless, one should look at
net opportunity costs, subtracting internal
conservation benefits, e.g., from clean water or
game. Even so, economics may not give the full
answer, because hard-to-monetarize cultural
benefits can also play a role.
Third, the vested land-use interests of external
stakeholders cannot be ignored. From timber
companies to intermediaries, district government to
the national economy, all benefit somehow from
timber rents. By foregoing these rents, they would
bear corresponding conservation opportunity costs.
Approaches that focus exclusively on the immediate
land users risk failure because they ignore powerful
external stakeholders and the ambiguity of land
tenure in tropical forest-frontier settings. Overlapping
rights and tenure claims need to be clarified
(although not necessarily legally formalized) before
a conservation concession can be established. Not
all stakeholders with net opportunity costs need to
be compensated, but their likely claims must be
evaluated and, if necessary, negotiated. Neighbors
with historical claims to the area perhaps have the
strongest case, but the needs of the district
government must also be accommodated because
of its political leverage on land use. Some strategic
reward—not necessarily recurrent cash payments—
may be required to build a resilient alliance for
conservation. The question of whom to compensate
in a conservation concession is thus not merely a
mechanical exercise in resource economics. It
underpins a strategic approach that is sensitive to
the political economy of land use.
Fourth, should one establish a CCC when local
people have already opted for conservation in their
own interest? Where is the additionality in this case?
A positive “ex ante” conservation attitude is
certainly a huge advantage for any CCC
intervention. Where there is a clear threat of
reversal, as in Setulang, with anti-conservation
push-and-pull factors intensifying, one cannot say
exactly when intra-communal decision making,
involving conflicting interests, would lead the
majority to abandon its position. The tipping point
is hard to predict, but the price of failure is
irreversible biodiversity loss. Many potential
biodiversity protection scenarios have characteristics
where small but strategic preventive payments make
sense. The CCC payments should be seen as a
strategic insurance premium or marginal subsidy
designed to raise the threshold of local net
conservation benefits.
Finally, a case like Setulang provides important
feedback to the global PES debate: a supply-side
bias—focusing one-sidedly on identifying potential
service-providing communities and their perceived
needs—is unlikely to lead to PES deals. Initiatives
at a much larger scale than Setulang, such as
Brazilian efforts to establish the public PES
program Proambiente in the Amazon, have had that
bitter experience (Wunder 2007). Even if PES at a
certain site or region clearly seems to be a good idea,
it is a “sine qua non” to work from the beginning
with the potential service buyers in the design and
direction of the proposal. Proactively educating
buyers and donors to help them realize the potential
benefits of PES, and what reforms would be required
from their side to implement the approach, may also
be necessary.
Responses to this article can be read online at:
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/vol13/iss1/art12/responses/
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